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Abstract 
 Climate change is anticipated by many to impact nearly every aspect of society in some 
way in the coming century. A potential to jeopardize security, especially in underdeveloped 
countries, is a claim commonly accepted by intelligence and security organizations but hotly 
debated in a growing body of scholarly literature. This study builds upon spatial methodology 
used in previous studies, and attempts to bridge outcomes to environmental and social context in 
a sample of 10 countries across Sub-Saharan Africa. The relationship between temperature 
change, precipitation variation from normal, ethnopolitical marginalization, and the existence of 
conflict was analyzed using disaggregated spatial and statistical methods, under the hypothesis 
that climate variation will correlate positively with conflict especially when it occurs in areas 
with marginalized people. The study finds some support for this hypothesis, indicating positive 
relationships with varying predictive strength among temperature and marginalization, but 
statistically insignificant results for precipitation. Logistic regression gave coefficients of 0.11 
for temperature change (°C), and 0.31 for marginalization when conducted on the entire sample. 
The study finds that the impact of all independent variables varies dramatically based on 
geography, and more useful results are returned by dividing the area into geographically and 
climatically similar groupings. These results moderately support claims that climate change will 
increase conflicts due to temperature but not for precipitation, but stress the importance of 
localized analysis and the peril of oversimplification.  
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Introduction 
 In the coming century, anthropogenic climate change will have far reaching impacts on 
global environmental systems and the quality of life for hundreds of millions of people. A 
preponderance of empirical evidence indicates that human activity since the industrial revolution 
has accelerated warming of the atmosphere. Estimates for the magnitude of global average 
warming range from 1℃ to 4+℃ depending on the rate and effectiveness of efforts to curb 
emissions (IPCC 2013). Such temperature change is predicted to invoke secondary impacts on 
hydrologic and ecologic systems. These impacts include an expansion of arid lands, higher 
frequency of intense weather patterns such as storms and droughts, shifting of the geographic 
ranges of certain ecosystems, altered precipitation patterns and freshwater availability among a 
myriad of others (Watson et al., 1998). Such large-scale shifts in the natural environment will 
invariably influence human ecosystem dynamics as well. Habitability of certain areas threatened 
by high temperatures and/or limited water availability, agricultural yields diminished by droughts 
and precipitation variability, coastal populations threatened by rising sea-levels, damage to 
infrastructure, spread of vector-borne diseases, and mass migration are all potential outcomes. 
When humans are subjected to these outcomes, many claim that climate change has an additional 
tertiary impact: inducing armed conflict.  
 Major intelligence and government agencies across the world have begun to recognize 
the security implications of climate change, many identifying it as one of the biggest threats to 
human security. As recently as March 2017, US Defense Secretary James Mattis identified 
climate change as a real-time security issue that is “impacting stability in areas of the world,” 
and that military command must “incorporate drivers of instability that impact the security 
environment in their areas into their planning” (Revkin, 2017). Much of this recent focus on the 
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security implications of climate change stem from prominent cases of conflict which can be tied 
to instability in the physical environment. Many scholars connect the 2011 Syrian uprising and 
resultant migrant crisis to a drought that occurred in the 5 years prior. This drought exposed 
decades of land and water resource mismanagement and caused rapid urban migration, which 
when combined with a repressive dictatorship and a blossoming extremist movement led to 
unrest (De Chatel, 2014). Similar environmental conflict narratives exist for cases across Sub-
Saharan Africa such as the Darfur conflict in 2003 (Mazo 2010), tensions between the Guji and 
Burji peoples in southern Ethiopia (Debelo 2012), Fulani herdsmen encroachment in Nigeria 
(Odoh and Chigozi, 2012), and potentially even the Rwandan genocide (Percival and Homer-
Dixon, 1996). This circumstantial evidence requires proper scientific support, however, in order 
to accurately claim that such conflict scenarios will worsen due to climate change. A significant 
but incomplete body of empirical research measuring the existence of a climate-conflict 
relationship has varying and inconclusive results, demonstrating the difficulty of quantifying the 
complex nexus of elements that contribute to conflicts in general. In context, climatic factors are 
mostly described as only having an “aggravating” effect on existing conflict triggers.  
This study builds from the (in)conclusions and methods of past studies, contributing to 
the relatively sparse amount of evidence derived from one specific methodology: spatial 
analysis. This technique emphasizes the distribution of variables over both time and space, and is 
the most effective method for analyzing continuous phenomena like climate that are strongly 
determined by geography, and can be a tool to explain why social events like conflict happen 
where they do. Analysis was conducted based on the two central hypotheses. First, that annual 
temperature and rainfall variability correlates positively with the geographic distribution of 
social conflict events. In order to provide an explanatory link between these seemingly distant 
4 
 
variables, ethnopolitical marginalization is proposed to have an amplifying effect on the 
relationship. The second hypothesis is that the combination of climate anomalies and 
marginalization are more spatially correlated with conflicts than either variable alone. Spatial 
and multivariate logistic regression analysis was conducted on social conflict events, climate 
data, and the distribution of marginalized groups from 1997-2013 in a sample extent that 
includes 10 Sahel and Central African countries.  
The study finds a positive relationship between conflict and temperature, and an 
insignificant positive relationship with precipitation across the entire sample. A 1° C increase in 
temperature from the previous year was found to be associated with an 11% greater probability 
of a conflict occurring in that location. For precipitation, an increase of 1 cm above the long-term 
mean increased conflict probability by 0.1% but with a p-value of 0.1. Marginalization was 
shown to also have a significant effect, and enhanced the impact of each climate variable when 
included in the model. These relationships were not constant, however, and were shown to vary 
significantly based on distinct geographic clusters. Locations in arid Sahel states tended to 
demonstrate significant positive relationships for both temperature and precipitation, whereas 
locations in more tropical climate near the African Great Lakes showed greater probability of 
conflict in cooler and wetter conditions. This demonstrates a major takeaway of the study: the 
type of relationship depends heavily on geographic and sociopolitical factors. This amplifies the 
need for more localized analysis that takes these factors into account, which was conducted on 
maps produced from the data and is summarized in the first section of the results. Overall, this 
study partially rejects the first hypothesis and finds weak support for the second, with evidence 
that differs somewhat from the predicted relationship outlined in the theory section. Most 
importantly, it finds that contextual factors impact this relationship significantly.  
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Literature Review 
The connection between climate change and propagation of armed conflict in developing 
regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be a young and constantly growing field of 
research. The widespread publication and distribution of climate change research itself began 
only a few decades ago with the first International Panel on Climate Change report in 1990. 
These works, published periodically leading up to the most recent 5th edition, represent the 
exhaustive conglomeration of current climate change research from the top atmospheric 
scientists. Past reports focused primarily on the scientific basis for climate change, modeling 
trends and providing evidence for the concept itself. To give some perspective on the recency of 
research focusing on causal links between climate change and security, a section detailing 
security concerns related to climate change only first appeared in the most recent IPCC report 
published in 2014. The report concluded that human security will be threatened by climate 
change as it intensifies, but the relationship between armed conflict and climate change requires 
further research to determine a causal theory (Adger et al. 2014). It specifically mentions Africa 
as a heavily studied region in the research. The Sub-Saharan region is highly indicative of 
climate change sensitive drivers of conflict, and also displays a relationship between areas with 
institutions that possess an ability to mitigate climate change effects and volume of violent 
conflict. 
Despite being a fairly new theory in relation to climate change specifically, the prevailing 
themes of this question have been present in social sciences for some time. The concept of 
“environmental conflict” stems from a scarcity model first introduced by the influential scholar 
Thomas Malthus in the early 19th century. Although his focus was specifically on population 
growth, the assertion that scarcity of resources can act as a driver for conflict continues to be a 
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primary causal explanation for correlations between climate change-affected regions and higher 
levels of conflict. A simple neo-Malthusian model would explain that climate change puts 
pressure on certain vital resources, limiting their supply, which leads to increased competition 
for those resources locally, or conflict elsewhere as people move in search of that resource. This 
model is especially applicable to Sub-Saharan Africa due to the high level of importance placed 
on the physical environment by many of its inhabitants through subsistence farming, and a high 
potential for institutional deficit in providing resources when scarcity arises. For many Sub-
Saharan Africans, subsistence farming is the only means of obtaining adequate nourishment 
(Hansen 2008). Homer-Dixon identifies four “social effects” of environmental change that can 
drive conflict, those being decreased agricultural production, economic decline, population 
displacement, and disruption of authoritative and legitimized institutions [Year]. 
There exist explanations for climate induced conflict beyond the resource scarcity model, 
identifying the direct effects that weather can have. One study finds a nonlinear but statistically 
significant relationship between higher temperatures and urban social conflict in African and 
Asian cities, with the strongest link at 20 °C (Yeeles 2015).  This supports the theory that 
orchestrating conflict becomes easier during warmer seasons. Other studies find that prolonged 
periods of warm weather provide a strategic incentive for actors to resolve problems associated 
with poor or unpredictable weather (Landis, 2014). Unusual periods of weather can cause people 
to deviate from normal routines, with warmer periods typically forcing people out of their homes 
and into social interaction (Cohen and Felson, 1979) aggravating the potential for social unrest 
and protest (AFP, 2012) and crime (Field, 1992). All of these studies describe temperature as a 
supplement to aggression rather than a trigger for conflict, and conclude that temperature, 
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although possessing a substantial effect, is outweighed by other covariates. This informs the role 
of climate as a catalyst for conflict, rather than a cause.  
Public and academic attention to this issue initially ramped up in 2009 with the study by 
Burke et al. brazenly titled “Warming Increases the Risk of Civil War in Africa”. This represents 
the first comprehensive study of an African climate-conflict relationship, the results of which are 
applied as a predictor for future conflicts based on climate projections. The study found that a 1° 
increase in temperature resulted in a 4.5% greater likelihood for civil conflict in all countries, 
and an 11% increase in countries that historically experience conflicts, using this information to 
predict a 54% increase in conflicts by 2030 due to climate change (Burke et al., 2009). Other 
studies find similar evidence, but varying in extent of the effect, supporting the assertion that 
climate anomalies correlate with higher numbers of conflict (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; 
O’Loughlin et al, 2012; Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012). Many studies find no relationship or 
inconclusive evidence for a relationship, however (Thiesen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). The 
Burke study is unique because it is largely forward-thinking, focusing less on causal explanations 
for the relationship, but rather applying a correlation to future climate change predictions in 
order to quantify the potential increase in conflict to be expected. Studies such as this one 
represent a recurring “deterministic” theme in the literature that garners some criticism (Salehyan 
2007). Salehyan warns against simplifying the relationship and disregarding the role of political 
institutions in adapting to and mitigating environmental conflict, emphasizing that the majority 
of resource scarcity and mass migration scenarios have not result in violent conflict, even in 
underdeveloped countries.  
The scarcity theory represents one of the fundamental approaches to understanding 
climate change conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, but as the body of research indicates, real drivers 
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of conflict in the region are much more complex than the simple neo-Malthusian causal chain. 
Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) explore such a “zero sum” explanation where groups compete for 
diminishing resources, but also present evidence for “abundance” scenarios where rent-seeking 
occurs during times of prosperity. Their analysis, and much of recent climate conflict research, is 
centered on variability rather than pure scarcity. Inspecting variability in rainfall patterns, an 
increasing trend likely due to climate change, they found evidence for heightened conflict during 
both drier and wetter periods. My research will use this dual-sided perspective on the issue, using 
temperature and rainfall anomalies as two of the independent variables. 
O’loughlin et al. (2012) also uses small scale variability weighed against an aggregate 
conflict database. They pursue a geographic approach to conflict and climate in East Africa, 
conducting spatial analysis on both temperature and rainfall variations from the mean pitted 
against the location and number of conflicts. The study focuses on location specific events by 
controlling for political and geographic boundaries in a 1° square grid rather than country-year 
analysis. Their findings are somewhat in contention with Raleigh and Kniveton, finding only that 
wetter periods correlate with a decreased risk of violence and that warmer temperatures 
correspond to increased risk of violence. They found no effect of cooler or drier periods on 
conflict. This methodology provides the groundwork for the design of my study, however it falls 
short due to the omission of key social factors. Fjelde and von Uexkull conducted a more 
comprehensive study in 2012, which includes the socio-political factors linking environmental 
stress to conflict. Their study not only suggests a positive relationship between rainfall anomalies 
and communal conflict but takes it a step further to explain that areas of high political 
marginalization and lack of institutional coping mechanisms amplifies the effects of climate on 
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conflict. Such a comprehensive study gives more insight to the complex drivers of conflict in the 
region, and is regarded as a better statistical model, but utilizes no spatial component. 
My research intends to utilize geographic data through spatial analysis, a method also 
used by Ide et al (2014) in their attempt to create a conflict risk model for Kenya and Uganda 
that incorporates presumed climate changes. Their conflict risk index (CRI) model uses a 
comprehensive set of variables including physical exposure to climate change, societal factors 
influencing the vulnerability to climate change, as well as other non-climate factors that drive 
conflict such as population and presence of democracy. Using this information, they constructed 
maps indicating which regions are prone to climate conflict. Ide et al.’s model is both complex in 
the number of variables utilized, but relies on many assumptions regarding the specific effect of 
each variable on conflict. The use of spatial analysis to model conflict prone regions is 
compelling and is intended for future use on a larger sample size, however again the causal 
relationships between climate variability and conflict remain a contentious avenue of research.    
A pervading conclusion throughout much of the existing literature is that climate change 
only partially contributes to conflict onset, and only in conjunction with other factors. Prominent 
examples of environmentally motivated conflict such as those in Darfur, Rwanda, Nigeria, 
Kenya and elsewhere indicate a commonality, among others, of ethnopolitical tension. Present 
throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa, due to postcolonial subdivision of territory based on 
arbitrary boundaries, is a high level of ethnic diversity within most countries. The power of 
ethnic identities and differences is often unavoidable in African politics, resulting in systems 
with an importance of hierarchy and patron-client relationships known as neopatrimonialism. In 
this system, the strength of political connections is often based on what one actor can provide to 
another, creating a vertical distribution of resources based around a powerful central authority, 
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with resources distributed through patron-client networks. This system, by design, favors the 
tribal or ethnic group at the center, and marginalizes those groups at the outer reaches of the 
patron-client networks. Groups marginalized to the greatest extent tend to be smaller local ethnic 
groups, nomadic or pastoral peoples, but the system disadvantages the ability for minority groups 
to obtain resources at the same level as the ruling group. The marginalization of certain 
ethnopolitical groups by system design sets the context for tensions against a government unable 
to provide adequate resources under scarcity scenarios.  
In attempting to disentangle the causal chain of climate change and conflict, many 
scholars have begun to look to political marginalization as the connecting factor. Although some 
studies have refuted the claim that civil war occurrence is greater in ethnically diverse countries 
or those ruled by an ethnic minority (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon et al, 2007), these studies 
have a more global focus. Considering the neopatrimonial and postcolonial context of African 
states, the contention that conflict can be triggered by ethnic diversity and marginalization 
remains worthy of study in the climate context. Clionadh Raleigh inspects the causal 
mechanisms connecting ethnopolitical marginalization and conflict, the conclusions from which 
will lay the foundation of the variables to be used for my analysis. That study is qualitative in 
nature, but describes the extent of political economic exclusion of certain ethnic groups, and how 
this increases vulnerability and inability to handle environmental shocks for marginalized 
groups. It calls for further empirical research on this relationship, with emphasis on spatial 
distribution as the most effective method to analyze the ethnopolitical topography (Raleigh 
2010).   
Such analysis was conducted by Theissen et al. in 2012, and their methods and analysis 
serve as the foundation for this study. They analyzed the spatial relationship between civil war 
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conflict events, drought, and ethnic distribution in 0.5° gridded cells under the hypotheses that 
drought increases the local risk of civil war and that these effects are larger in politically 
marginalized areas. They found little evidence to indicate a connection between drought and civil 
war, but strong evidence showing conflict events occurring in areas of high political 
marginalization and other factors. They conclude that although no clear relationship was 
discovered between drought and conflict, that it plays some role and requires further research. I 
utilize much the methodology used in the Thiessen et al. study, but widen the scope of analysis 
to focus on social conflict using the ACLED database and include an independent variable for 
temperature, while limiting the geographical sample of states to 10 located within vulnerable 
Sahel, Central, and East African regions.  
As shown with these selected pieces, research in climate conflict in Africa has only 
seriously occurred in the past decade. There is still much to be explored and explained as the 
body of research expands, coinciding with the relative difficulty of predicting the precise effects 
of climate change. The studies outlined here, as well as many others, have shown varying and 
inconclusive relationships between climate variability and conflict and have even begun to create 
a model to determine security threats based on those relationships. Nils Gleditsch, an influential 
scholar in climate conflict, identified five priorities for future research in 2012. One of these 
priorities, and one identified by the countless other studies, is a greater focus on disentangling 
the causal mechanisms that explain why a relationship between climate and conflict exists in 
some circumstances, and is not evident in others. My research fits into this priority well, by 
examining one potential causal factor through the lens of spatial analysis. Expanding on the 
study by Thiessen et al, this study will examine the spatial relationships between distributions of 
ethnopolitically marginalized groups, climate variability, and the density of social conflict events 
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across a selected region at a standard resolution. This aids in contributing to the meager and 
largely inconclusive body of spatial evidence for the climate-conflict claim, while analyzing this 
claim against a specific explanatory factor.  
 
Theory 
 My theory of climate change induced conflict, in line with much of existing conflict 
theory in Africa, hinges on the influence of instability and marginalization. Climate change is 
predicted to bring higher average temperatures and varying dramatic shifts in rainfall patterns to 
much of the African continent. Hydrologic systems that incorporate both atmospheric 
precipitation and groundwater content will be affected across the region with varying outcomes. 
The Sahel region bordering the southern edge of the Sahara desert is predicted to experience 
temperature increase and precipitation decrease, contributing to the positive feedback process of 
desertification. This differs in the tropical rainforests of Central African states where more 
precipitation is predicted in the future, and average temperatures will not see much change. 
Extreme weather events such as drought or flooding, rather than gradual change, will induce the 
most significant social impacts however. These impacts include decreased agricultural yields, 
population displacement, economic decline, and disruption of institutions. Many factors make 
Sub-Saharan Africa particularly vulnerable to these social effects: strong reliance on subsistence 
agriculture, generally low wealth per capita, comparatively weak and imbalanced political and 
economic institutions, and, a diverse and sometimes contentious ethnic makeup within states. 
Environmental change within the context of these factors threatens resource security and 
economic success for individuals who rely on climate stability to ensure agricultural output, or 
live in areas of already limited freshwater availability. This threat is heightened by the fact that 
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most African subsistence farmers or pastoralists do not have the wealth to insulate against 
periods of low production, and a more general difficulty to acquire resources when localized 
supplies are threatened due to inequity in resource-distribution infrastructures. The nexus of 
these factors demonstrate the significance of human-environment relationships in this region and 
how it contributes to a system of political ecology.  
Other elements beyond direct dependence on agriculture can connect environmental 
change to violence. The effects of sustained shocks like multi-year droughts can be felt 
throughout the economy of an agricultural state, and availability of vital resources may be 
threatened even for groups not directly tied to the land. The degradation of a common resource 
such as a shared freshwater source, can provoke conflict between groups who were peaceful 
when the resource was plentiful. Conflict may arise due to the movement of populations as well. 
Degradation of a resource in one place may force the people of that area to move elsewhere in 
order to sustain their livelihood. Common examples of this are nomadic pastoralists in search of 
water and grazing land for their livestock, or destitute farmers relocating to urban centers in 
search of employment. Displaced populations sometimes experience aggression when they 
impede on territory or threaten the resource share of the destination population. Additionally, a 
glut of unemployed and desperate young men in urban centers can be easily swayed by militant 
and extremist groups who offer food and shelter in exchange for military service. Large 
populations of economically stressed individuals with common strife and without peaceful 
institutional means to express their distress, can turn to rioting or small-scale violence as protest 
or a way to improve their situation, especially when hot weather induces irritability. The 
diversity of potential causal pathways for environmentally influenced conflicts demonstrates the 
complexity of the proposed relationship, as well as the importance of situational context to 
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determining drivers of conflicts in general. While the theory does not claim that climatic shifts 
invariably lead to more conflicts, it does identify the importance those shifts can have in certain 
contexts, and the ability to increase the likelihood of conflict over a status-quo scenario. The first 
argument is that when economic or resource stability is threatened by changes in climate, people 
have a greater tendency to resort to violent measures to meet their needs.  
 
H1: Temperature and precipitation anomalies are positively correlated with probability of 
conflict.  
The second component of the theory attempts to understand why violent, rather than 
peaceful means are used in these scenarios. This requires an understanding of the political 
schemes of Sub-Saharan African states, emphasizing the role of neopatrimonialism and ethnic 
marginalization in contemporary African politics. Based on neo-patrimonial theory, the loyalty 
of patrons to a central authority is dependent on resource transactions that benefit the patron. Due 
to the highly diverse ethnic makeup of most African states, this method of rule is often evidenced 
as a way to control tribal and ethnic groups different than that at the highest point in the power 
hierarchy. These relationships comprise the “political topography” of Africa, where ethnic 
groups are often regarded as relevant or irrelevant to the national agenda. I argue that if resources 
become scarce due to changes in climate for a localized ethnic group, they will be more likely to 
resort to social violence if they are marginalized by the ruling group. Most existing research has 
concluded that environmental change is not enough to induce conflict on its own, but that it acts 
as a catalyst for other existing sources of conflict. Seeing as ethnic tension and marginalization 
are some of the strongest drivers of conflict in the region, I argue that ethnically marginalized 
groups will be more likely to experience social conflict during environmental change than those 
with greater political and economic power. Lack of political voice makes it more difficult to 
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obtain resources from the central authority through peaceful means under scarcity scenarios, and 
I also argue that a history of inaccessibility to national wealth for ethnically marginalized groups 
makes them less insulated to income shocks and can brew dissatisfaction attributed to ethnic 
identity.  
Violence in this scenario can be explained as a means for “have-nots” to compete with 
the “haves” under exogenous pressures, but also as a catalyst for existing ethno-cultural tensions 
to boil over into conflict. Scarcity scenarios can highlight ethnic differences between groups 
competing for a common resource. On a small scale this can manifest as two ethnically distinct 
groups that employ identity-based tactics to fight for control over a shared environmental 
resource such as a water body, as evidenced by the Guji-Burji conflict in Ethiopia. On a national 
scale, the common resource could be interpreted as share of national wealth or political 
influence, the importance of which is heightened when environmental shocks or changes threaten 
the livelihoods of certain regions. Neo-patrimonial hierarchies of ethnicity further balkanize 
ethnic groups, leading to dissatisfaction with the political or economic regime for groups with 
sub-optimal shares of national resources, and greater potential for civil and social unrest. 
Scarcity, or surplus, of environmental resources can also benefit existing militant groups with 
extraneous political or religious aims. Control of a vital scarce resource such as a body of 
freshwater or agricultural fields exerts an immense level of control over the surrounding 
population. Inability to obtain sustenance independently often lead to exploitation and looting of 
the share of others, which is executed with greater success by groups with the ability for coercion 
through the threat of violence. Some insurgent groups also find havens in inhospitable lands 
where they can easily hide from government authorities. Finally, in-fighting between ethnic 
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groups can be a source of income during times of economic stress, leading to higher conscription 
rates in rebel armies.  
 
H2: The relationship between climate variability and conflict is stronger where the primary 
ethnic group is marginalized.  
 
 The complexity of possibilities for climate-related conflict scenarios highlights the need 
for contextualized analysis of this phenomenon. This can be achieved through the qualitative 
spatial analysis that identifies certain areas that display any especially strong or interesting 
relationships, and uses case studies of that specific occurrence to understand how the climate-
conflict link varies in different geographic or political contexts. It is unlikely that the same 
correlation exists across all contexts of the sample area, but rather this research aims to 
understand the spatial environments that may or may not be at risk for future climate-related 
conflicts. In addition to analyzing the effect of the physical environment on human behavior, the 
sociological environments of ethnopolitical hierarchy are necessary to inspect as well. The 
combination of these factors, environmental and human, with their highly nuanced and 
interconnected systems constitutes one piece of the complex fabric of contemporary conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
Methods 
 The results from previous studies on this topic vary widely in their assessment of the 
existence or strength of the relationship proposed in the hypothesis of this study, and are heavily 
contingent on the methodology used. Early studies on climate change conflict rely on traditional 
large-N, country-year research design that oversimplifies and misrepresents the nuanced 
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relationship between the variables. Many more recent studies utilize spatial methodology that 
allows researchers to shift the scale of analysis in order to focus on sub-state actors and localized 
climate factors. Following this trend, this study utilizes a disaggregated spatial approach that 
enables a higher level of detail and uniformity in the analysis. Because both the impacts of 
predicted climate change and the propensity for conflict depend on localized geographic and 
politico-economic factors, the emphasis of analysis is placed on the spatial distribution of the 
selected variables. Climate change and conflict are each inherently spatial phenomena, and are 
examined as such.  
The independent variables of the study are temperature change, precipitation variation, 
and the extent of ethnopolitical marginalization. These variables were processed into individual 
and mosaic raster map layers, and then analyzed against the distribution of the dependent 
variable: the density of conflict events. The sample of raster cells lie in a horizontal band near the 
equator from Western Eastern Africa, encompassing 10 countries and 4,565 individual cells. 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Sudan, 
South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia are included in the study. These states were selected 
in order to improve the future application of the study, due to greater susceptibility in this region 
to the effects of climate change, and a prevalence of ethnically motivated conflicts in the past. 
The sample was also selected to include a broad spectrum of climate conditions, from the lower 
bounds of the semi-arid Sahel region in Sudan and Chad, to the dry savannahs and highlands of 
Kenya and Ethiopia, and further south into the equatorial rainforests of the DRC and Uganda. 
This geographic area was divided into uniform square gridded cells of 0.5 degrees 
(approximately 55 kilometers), and cells were assigned values based on operationalization of the 
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independent variables in the area they encompass. This gives separate layer packages for each 
year within the temporal scale of 1997-2013.  
 In order to properly build from the research design constructed by Theisen et al., similar 
data sources were used when available. As with the Theisen study, data measuring 
marginalization was generated from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. This spatial 
dataset contains polygons displaying the settlement area for major ethnic groups, and codes these 
groups based on their level of political inclusion within the government of their country. This 
coding also follows changes in political inclusion over time, so separate spatial representations 
were generated for each year in the timeframe. The EPR polygons were then converted to a 
gridded raster layer to facilitate combination with the climate variables, and coded “1” for 
marginalized ethnic groups (MEG) or “0” for groups with all or some share of power. MEG are 
those whose power status is classified as Regional Autonomy, Irrelevant, Discriminated, or 
Powerless by the EPR dataset, indicating that political leaders of that group are excluded in some 
way from participation in the central government of the country (Wimmer et al., 2009). The EPR 
dataset ends in 2010, so 2010 EPR values were extrapolated to the remaining years in the study. 
 Similar data was used for the calculation of precipitation anomalies, drawn from the 
Global Precipitation Climatology Centre (GPCC). This dataset provides individual raster maps 
showing monthly total precipitation (mm) in a 0.5 x 0.5 degree resolution, as well as monthly 
normal mean values calculated from the period 1901-2013. To convert these monthly totals into 
yearly anomalies from the given mean, first the monthly layers for each year were added together 
to give the total annual precipitation for each cell. These map layers were then subtracted from 
the mean annual precipitation layer, giving negative anomaly values for cells with less rainfall 
than average, and positive values for years with excess rainfall. Temperature data, a variable not 
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included in the Theisen study, was retrieved from the Global Historical Climatology Network 
Climate Anomaly Monitoring System (GHCN CAMS) monthly land surface temperature 
analysis. It gives individual monthly mean temperatures from 1948 to the present, along with the 
long-term monthly mean calculated from 1980-2010 (Fan and Dool, 2007). To calculate the 
yearly change, the individual month values were averaged to give a yearly average temperature, 
which was then subtracted from the average of the previous year. This methodology potentially 
limits the ability to analyze the aggravating effect of the extreme short-term temperature 
variations which could be lost when averaging, however broader temperature trends were 
preserved. The data selected for these climate factors serve as a moderate predictor of drought 
conditions, and allow for more specialized analysis of climate impacts than use of a drought 
index. Under climate change scenarios, some regions in the area of study will receive 
significantly more rainfall rather than less, and may only witness negligible temperature change. 
Understanding the climate-conflict relationship beyond the simple expectation of drought is 
fundamental to the goals of this study. 
 Data for conflict events was retrieved from the Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Database project (ACLED), which includes all violent events in the period 1997-2015. This 
source places greater emphasis on small-scale social conflict than the UCDP, containing 36,656 
events that range from riots to civil war conflict events. The “protest” and “strategic 
development” event types were excluded from the dataset, however, due to their non-violent 
nature, but “non-violent transfer of territory” was included because of its potential to convey 
migration induced conflicts. These events were converted from their original point format into 
gridded cells classified based on the density of points within each cell, and separate layers were 
created for total conflict count and a binary coding for conflict or no conflict. Once all data was 
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compiled and organized annually, spatial statistical analysis was performed to delineate any 
geographical relationships between the variables. Many regression models were applied to the 
data, but the Generalized Linear Model was found to be the most accurate and intuitive model, as 
it also accounts for any potential random effects in the results. Three versions of this model were 
run. Model 1 with just the EPR data and controls, Model 2 with only climate variables and 
controls, and Model 3 with all three independent variables. Changes in the coefficients and odds 
ratio for each variable were tracked to determine their relative strength in each model. In addition 
to the quantitative multivariate analysis, qualitative visual analysis was performed to describe 
relationships, or lack thereof, that may have been missed through statistical analysis and to place 
statistical findings in their proper context.  
 In order to account for exogenous factors, a few control measures were utilized by 
including some other variables in the regression. The natural log of total population for each cell 
was included, the data acquired from Gridded Population of the World v.3. Codings for the 
relative level of democracy was also joined to the dataset at the country level, and included as 
input in the regression. Controls not included from the Theisen methodology are the dummy 
variable for capital cities because of the broadening of scope to include social conflict; the buffer 
for state borders because their importance may be insignificant for marginalized groups living on 
the fringe of their countries; and the conflict history decay function, because of the potential for 
climatic factors to exacerbate existing conflicts.  
 
 
Results 
 Results from this study can be grouped into two categories: qualitative visual assessment 
of general and local trends in the map layers, and quantitative statistical analysis measuring the 
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cumulative relationship between the variables. The qualitative trend assessment represents the 
initial findings of this study, and is meant to provide supporting details for the story of conflict in 
this region. The actual propagation of conflict events, as opposed to non-violent disagreement 
between groups, is very much a result of a multitude of developments that comprise what will be 
referred to here as the contextual conflict narrative. The goal of the qualitative assessment is to 
tell this narrative to the best of my abilities, using environmental and ethnic marginalization 
factors as explanatory tools. The first section of results will progress from 1997 through the end 
of the time series in 2013, discussing the trends displayed in the spatial data frame. The strength 
of qualitative assessment is in explaining the trends and triggers behind past events, but 
unfortunately it is not that good for providing empirical evidence for relationships that can be 
applied to future conditions. Such empirical evidence is established in the quantitative statistical 
analysis conducted and described in the second part of this section. There, multivariate 
regression analysis is performed using all variables over the entire time-series in order to 
delineate macro trends in the data, and to inform a potential comparative risk model for future 
events.  
  
Spatial Trends 
 Within the time-series studied, visual assessment of the spatial data suggests conflict is 
moderately correlated with precipitation variation, weakly correlated with temperature variation, 
and has a vacillating relationship with the distribution ethnopolitical marginalization. The 
occurrence of these relationships differed starkly depending on factors such as geography, 
political structure of residing governments, among an unknown number of others. A primary and 
striking finding was that precipitation and temperature variation appear to possess inverse 
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relationships with conflict depending on latitude and the physical environment of the event. In 
the terminally dry Sahel and lower Sahara region to the north of the study area, years with less 
precipitation often saw more conflict, whereas in the wetter tropical areas like the eastern DRC 
and Uganda conflict was apparently often associated with more rainfall. This fundamental 
difference demonstrates the complexity, and often dichotomy, of the climate-conflict 
relationship, and reinforces the need for localized analysis that considers the environment as a 
unique and important factor in conflict risk. Assessment of spatial trends in these layers also 
gives valuable insight and visual representation of the environmental conditions of the prominent 
conflict events that occurred during the time-series, and whether climate may have played as 
much or as little a role as is suggested by the relevant literature and media. These illustrations 
include the pivotal drought and abundance conditions leading up to and accelerating the Sudan 
and Darfur crisis, the persistent dry conditions contributing to the devastating 2002 famine in 
Ethiopia and the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria, as well as a trend of violence occurring in 
abundant rainfall years that follow an extended dry period.  
These findings and others are discussed in this section, and the reader is encouraged to 
pair the reading of this discussion with their own inspection of the maps located in the appendix. 
These maps are listed by variable and year, and an example of one year in the set is given below. 
The first map shows the distribution of marginalized people, with light red indicating areas 
where the primary ethnic group is classified as an MEG in the EPR dataset. The second map 
displays precipitation variation from the long-term mean, with zero values indicated by yellow-
green and conflicts shown in blue. Temperature change from the previous year is displayed in the 
third map, with oranges and red indicating areas with positive temperature shocks. The year 
shown here, 2003, demonstrates intense fighting in northern Uganda, scattered fighting and 
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unrest across Nigeria, and the genesis of the Darfur genocide. The EPR map shows some 
association with marginalized groups, especially in Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda. From these 
maps, a reader can see that many conflict areas received greater than normal precipitation and 
had hotter temperatures, indicating a potential abundance scenario. As the discussion advances 
through the time-series, the maps located in the appendix of other years will provide valuable 
visual evidence of spatial trends to the reader, and convey any relationships that may not be 
explicitly discussed here.  
 
 
 Beginning in the first years of the study, some prevailing trends become evident in the 
data. Less than normal precipitation occurred in the region encompassing the northeast Congo, 
northern Uganda, southern Sudan (now South Sudan) and western Kenya from 1997-2001. This 
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region will further be referred to as the Great Lakes region. This period of low rainfall was 
roughly accompanied by the distribution of conflict events, primarily between the Ugandan 
government and various rebels groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern 
Uganda, and those representing the First and Second Congo Wars. The time-series of this studies 
begins in Medias res a year after both of these conflicts began in 1996, so the causative 
relationship is difficult to determine. 1998 and 1999 brought considerably warmer temperatures 
and extremely dry weather to much of the Congo, coinciding with the rejuvenation of tensions 
and the beginning of the Second Congo war in August 1998. Fighting spread across the country 
in 1999, following the dry areas each year before settling into the front along the Uganda-
Burundi-Rwanda border where fighting would continue throughout the remainder of the time-
series. Negative rainfall variation across Kenya in 1999 and 2000 also lead to an increase of 
unrest across the country, mostly expressed in the form of pastoral raiding (Kratli and Swift, 
1999). This style of conflict also occurred along the Congo-Uganda border with the Ituri Conflict 
waged from 1999-2003. 2001 brought higher than normal rainfall and cooler temperatures to the 
Great Lakes region, coinciding with the concentration of the Ituri Conflict, providing an initial 
glimpse at the potential for abundance scenario conflict. 
To the north, in the arid lands of Sudan (and present-day South Sudan), Chad, the Central 
African Republic, and the highlands of Ethiopia, drought and tensions were growing. Sudan 
finds itself in the final stages of the Second Sudanese Civil War, a conflict originating from land 
degradation due to drought threatening the livelihood of disadvantaged farmers in the south 
(Domke 1997). The distribution of fighting for this war appears to roughly correlate with dry 
areas from 1997-2000, followed by a refugee crisis in 2000 and 2001 at the Ethiopian border in 
an anomalous wet area for both years. Throughout this time southern and central Ethiopia 
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experienced negative rainfall years, which came to a head in 2002 with the especially dry and hot 
weather that incited widespread famine, and accompanied revamped fighting with ethnic rebel 
groups like the marginalized Oromo and Ogaden peoples in the west and east respectively 
(Brown 2008) (Notholt 2008).  
Fighting in Ethiopia and eastern Sudan would calm somewhat in 2003, but would shift to 
the western province of Darfur in conjunction with rising temperatures and a prolonged period of 
less than normal rainfall. Interestingly, 2003 was a year in which the Darfur region actually 
received rainfall above the long term mean, potentially supporting an abundance scenario theory. 
Some reject the notion that the Darfur Genocide was influenced by negative changes in rainfall 
(Kevane 2008), but an abundance scenario claim has not been thoroughly investigated. 
Following its onset, a pattern of unrest would continue in Darfur through the end of the time-
series, roughly waxing and waning in conjunction with changes in precipitation. More rainfall 
usually translated to less conflicts or more concentrated unrest, and vice versa. In 2005 Darfur 
unrest began to spill over into neighboring Chad, sparking a similar civil war there between the 
Muslim controlled north and Christian Sub-Saharan south that would persist until 2010. The 
drivers of this conflict strongly support the theory of neo-patrimonialism and its pitfalls, which 
collapsed once the president Idriss Deby could no longer appease his patrons in the face of 
Sudanese encroachment (De Waal 2008). As for climate interactions, the year before the 
outbreak of the civil war was drier than normal and much of the fighting in 2005 and 2006 
occurred in areas receiving more rainfall. Fighting in the final years of the civil war occurred in 
dry conditions, and significantly warmer temperatures in 2009 and 2010. This might imply that 
hostile environmental circumstances, especially in the steppe and semi-desert climates of states 
like Chad and Sudan, could facilitate the expiration of conflicts. If this were to be true, the adage 
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“don’t invade Russia in the winter” might need updating to “don’t invade a Saharan country 
when Earth is warming”.  
Conflict in the Central African Republic presents possibly the most compelling 
qualitative evidence for a correlation with precipitation. Various conflict events in the country 
from 2000-2005 coincide closely with changing negative precipitation patterns in the western 
part of the country leading up to the outbreak of the Central African Bush War in 2004. This 
conflict would persistent intermittently until the outbreak of the 2013 Coup detat, largely 
irrespective to precipitation patterns.  
Back in the Great Lakes Region, the pattern of conflict remains fairly stable from 2002-
2007, roughly resembling an upside-down horseshoe around Lake Victoria from eastern Congo 
through northern Uganda and into western Kenya. 2003 marked a pivotal moment in the 
Congolese imbroglio with the onset of the ethnically driven Kivu Conflict, which would entrench 
DRC forces in this area along the Rwandan border through the end of the time-series in 2013. 
The area was generally drier than normal in 2002 and 2003, with an influx of precipitation in 
2004 which accompanied the Bukavu Offensive and the first clash in the area. Again, the 
abundance scenario pattern might have contributed to the origination of this conflict. In this case, 
the EPR dataset is perhaps the greatest indicator of conflict, as the area was a pocket of 
“marginalized” people until 2004 when control of the area was gained by the dominant group. 
While the Kivu Conflict was nearing its apex in 2007, Kenya was experiencing its own crisis. An 
ethnic divide between supporters of the two presidential candidates boiled over when it was 
alleged that the winner of the election had done so illegitimately, leading to violence that 
originated in the southwest city of Kisumu on the shores of Lake Victoria and soon spread across 
the country. Refuting the hypothesis proposed in this thesis, it does not appear that precipitation 
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or temperature variation affected violence in the way predicted. Kenya experienced extremely 
dry and warm conditions in 2005, followed by a very wet year in 2006, normal weather in 2007, 
and dry conditions once again in 2008. The marginalization of the Luo and other non-Kikuyu 
peoples, and subsequent powershift following the conflict, is demonstrated by the EPR data, but 
the unrest does not appear to have been influenced by climate.  
In 2009, east and central Africa experienced the most extreme drought conditions in the 
time-series, with negative rainfall anomalies across the region and high temperatures (Nyakairu 
2009). Central Uganda and South Sudan received the most severe deviations, which were 
accompanied by a starburst of conflict throughout Uganda, E and NE Congo, and South Sudan. 
The Lord’s Resistance Army renewed fighting during this time by carrying out the Christmas 
Massacres in northern DRC and the Garamba Offensive in Uganda. These last attempts by the 
LRA to remain relevant coincided with a severe drought, potentially to further demoralize 
citizens already in distress or to retake critical resources like food and water when their own 
shares began to dwindle. Fighting slowly declined and dispersed in the region through 2012 
along with more regular precipitation and temperature patterns. In Uganda, the fighting migrated 
towards the Kenyan border in conjunction with more rainfall in 2010. A brief ceasefire was 
enforced by the UN in the Congo DRC in 2009-2010 which dramatically reduced the number of 
skirmishes there. The conflict was revived in 2011, however, with new fighting in the Ituri and 
Kivu conflict areas occurring along with more rainfall in that year and 2012. This renewed unrest 
also occurred almost exclusively within areas coded as marginalized in the EPR dataset. By 
2013, negative rainfall variation through much of the central region of the study accompanied 
dramatically more conflicts distributed across NE Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda. Greater 
levels of unrest also occurred in western Kenya and western CAR, but with positive rainfall 
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variation. It is important to note that the steady increase in conflict events over the course of the 
time series does not necessarily indicate greater violence, but rather could simply reflect 
improved data collection and reporting on these events.  
Mention of Nigeria and Cameroon has been absent from the discussion so far, and with 
good reason. Due to air and weather circulation patterns, the climate trends in Nigeria tended to 
work inversely to those occurring in the central and eastern regions of the sample area. Nigeria 
and Cameroon often experienced times of cooling when the rest of the sample was warming, and 
the same goes for precipitation. In this way, much like the tropical climate of E Congo, Nigeria 
contributes a unique perspective to the diverse array of environments present in the sample. This 
diversity exists even within the country, with dramatically different environments present in the 
wet coastal south and dry Sahel north. Additionally, the specific strength of ethnic factors present 
in Nigerian politics and dichotomy in conflict type by region make cause it to possess additional 
unique social factors as a part of its narrative. Cameroon is similar in geography, albeit with less 
Sahel area, but differs greatly in its propensity for conflict. Throughout the time-series it 
experienced only a few conflict events. The narrative for the climate-conflict relationship and the 
absence of conflict in Cameroon will be discussed further below.  
Before beginning discussion on the spatial trends of conflict in Nigeria over time, it is 
important to describe the normal distribution of conflict events in the country. This distribution 
can generally be described in binary terms of north and south, similar in some characteristics and 
causes to the ethnic, political, and resource distributions of the state. In the south is the densely 
populated coastal region containing the capital city and the location of most of the highly 
valuable oil and manufacturing industry. It is also the home to the majority Christian Igbo and 
Yaruba tribes. Throughout the time-series violence was present at a consistent rate in the 
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southern region, due in parts to a dense population, political unrest at the capital, and the ongoing 
animosity and conflict against the oil industry. Northern Nigeria transitions from a temperate 
climate into a semi-arid Sahel environment in its northernmost extent. This part of the state is 
inhabited by the Hausa and Fulani peoples, who are primarily Muslim. It is more sparsely 
populated, besides the Kano region, and agriculture is its primary industry and way of life. 
Tensions between the Muslim north and Christian South have long been an instigator of conflict, 
and a cause for political anxiety from both groups. This social environment is primed for climate 
instability to act as a catalyst for existing ethnic tensions. Such conflict would be expected to 
occur near the general line of ethnic divide across the middle of the country where ethnically and 
religiously diverse populations live in close proximity, and throughout the northern region where 
most depend on subsistence agriculture and where desertification is beginning to take root. It is 
important to distinguish these conflicts from the seemingly constant and independent presence of 
unrest along the coast.  
The time series begins in the later stages of the Abacha years and the resurgence of 
conflict between Christians and Muslims. Conflicts were mostly concentrated in the coastal 
region through 2001, primarily social unrest near oil refineries and due to the 1999 elections. 
2000 and 2001 represented pivotal years in Christian-Muslim tensions as sharia law was adopted 
by several northern states and a tribal war broke out in the Benue state. These developments 
were accompanied by temperature spikes that correlated closely with the occurrence of conflict, 
especially in 2001 where a pocket of extreme temperature increase and conflicts materialized the 
northern region. Some of these were riots in the city of Jos over increased Islamic control in 
government, which happened very near the epicenter of the temperature spike. A prolonged 
period of dryness also persisted in this region through 2006. Warmer temperatures continued in 
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2002 accompanied by further ethnic rioting, before cooling somewhat in 2003. Reduced 
precipitation and warmer temperatures coincided with more ethnic violence in the central plateau 
region in 2004. From 2004-2008 a large amount of violence occurred near oil refineries in the 
southern Niger Delta, but these conflicts were largely unrelated to climate changes. Leading up 
to the outbreak of Boko Haram, Nigeria experienced a steady trend of warming every year and 
mostly less than normal precipitation. In 2009, temperatures skyrocketed in northern Nigeria at 
the same time that Boko Haram began its first campaign of violence in an effort to impose Sharia 
law on the entire country. This violence continued in the warmer and wetter year of 2010, 
exacerbated by the unexpected death of the sitting president and political transition. From 2011 
through 2013 violence incited by Boko Haram continued to ramp up especially in the northern 
region. This period was actually cooler than years before, but 2011 and 2013 presented 
extremely dry conditions in central Nigeria. These results suggest conflict onset is correlated 
positively with temperature, especially coinciding with rioting in 2001 and the rise of Boko 
Haram in 2009, and correlated slightly negatively with precipitation.  
Cameroon experienced the least number of conflicts of any country in the sample, most 
of which were results of interstate dynamics with neighboring Nigeria and Chad. Throughout the 
time-series Cameroon possessed no ethnic areas that were coded as being marginalized, 
indicating a lack of conflict potential due to this variable. Any unrest that did occur was 
concentrated in its northern territory protruding between northeast Nigeria and southwest Chad, 
along its eastern border with Central African Republic, or near the coastal city of Douala. No 
clear relationships between the climate variables and conflict onset could be identified by the 
qualitative methods used. Rather, conflicts in Cameroon were most accurately explained by the 
presence of conflict in neighboring countries. Clashes in the north occurred due to a migrant 
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crisis fleeing from the 2005 Chadian Civil War, and some spillover of violence perpetrated by 
Boko Haram from 2009-2013. Similar trends existed in eastern Cameroon where conflict 
spillover occurred due to civil wars in Central African Republic in 2007 and 2013. The peaceful 
nature of the Cameroonian state might be explained by the lack of a clearly marginalized group 
despite over 350 different ethnic groups, although it is not immune to the spread of Islam and the 
potential for ensuing violence from the north. 
  
Statistical Analysis 
 Summary statistics were calculated for each variable, and are displayed in Table 1 below. 
The average temperature change for any given cell was 0.04 °C, implying a relative equilibrium 
between positive and negative temperature change but with a slight upwards trend over the 16 
year period. The most dramatic negative temperature shock was -2.04 °C in Sudan in 2011, and 
hottest change was an increase of 1.78 °C in South Sudan in 2000. Precipitation variation had an 
average value of 0.28 cm which means the long term mean was an adequate predictor of the 
normal value. The driest cell in the sample was in the DRC in 1998 and had a precipitation 
variation of -78 cm. The wettest was in Sudan in 2000 with an anomaly of 129 cm above 
average. EPR had an average right around 0.5 which indicates a near even spread of 
marginalized and dominant territory.  
Table 1 Summary statistics for independent and dependent variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Temp Change 49,317 0.042 0.338 -2.049 1.788
Conflicts 49,317 0.527 3.461 0 157
Democracy 49,317 0.062 3.84211 -7 9
Precipitation 49,317 0.286 17.902 -78.779 129.506
lnPopulation 48,433 10.334 1.649 3.907 15.471
EPR 49,317 0.473 0.499 0 1
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 Initial assessment of the outputs from logistic regression partially rejects hypothesis 1 and 
finds very weak support for hypothesis 2, with some key distinctions from what was predicted in 
the theory. Many different multivariate regression models were applied to the data in a variety of 
ways, in order to obtain the most comprehensive understanding of existing relationships both 
across the entire sample area and within country and year subsets. Table 2 gives the products of 3 
applications for the most suitable regression model for this data, binomial logit generalized linear 
model, testing each of the hypotheses. Each value represents the “odds ratio” for the given 
variable, and the standard error is given in parentheses below. The odds ratio describes each 
variable’s impact on the probability of a conflict occurring if the variable’s value is increased by 
1, using a center value of 1 that implies no discernable impact (50/50 odds). So, an odds ratio 
greater than 1 means that the independent variable increases the probability of a conflict 
occurring by its decimal amount. Odds ratios less than 1 are more difficult to intuitively 
interpret, but can roughly be described as the independent variable translating to a reduced 
probability of conflict occurrence. For example, the control variable population has a 1.64 odds 
ratio, which implies that an increase of 1 in the natural log of the population for a given cell 
correlates with a 64% higher probability of conflict occurring there. A table displaying the 
regression coefficients is also displayed in the appendix of this study.  
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Table 2. GLM regression outputs using three statistical models 
 
 M1 M2 M3 
    
Democracy 1.046* 1.044* 1.046* 
 (11.55) (11.04) (11.70) 
    
EPR 1.366*  1.369* 
 (10.21)  (10.27) 
    
Population 1.645* 1.608* 1.644* 
 (46.59) (46.02) (46.50) 
    
Temp Change  1.116* 1.117* 
  (2.43) (2.47) 
    
Precipitation  1.001 1.001 
  (1.05) (1.62) 
N 48433 48433 48433 
Odds ratios; z statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
 
The full sample extent results in Table 2 can be examined using this understanding of 
odds ratios. Model 1 measures the individual effect of ethnopolitical marginalization on conflict, 
independent from climate variables. It shows that areas coded as marginalized are 36% more 
likely to experience conflict. This is an expected finding that does contradict results in some 
other studies where no global spatial correlation between marginalization and conflict was 
determined (Fearon), but supports more localized theories relating to Africa and Sahel states 
(Raleigh 2010) (Buhaug 2008). The control variable population shows an expected positive 
correlation with conflict, supporting the control assertion that conflicts are more likely to occur 
in areas with more people. The country-level control for level of democracy showed a weak but 
surprising positive effect, implying that conflict risk increases by around 4% as countries become 
more democratic.  
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Model 2 in Table 2 tests climate variables as inputs for analysis, and shows a positive 
relationship for both inter-annual temperature change and precipitation variation, but with 
differing statistical significance. The findings for temperature change were the most significant 
of the study. According to the model used, every 1℃ increase in temperature from the preceding 
year is associated with an 11.6% increase in conflict probability. Although most cells rarely 
experienced temperature fluctuations greater than 1 degree within the time-series, fluctuations as 
high as 1.8 ℃ and as low as -2℃ were observed. The odds ratio for precipitation variation 
initially appears to be small, but further interpretation of these findings provides more applicable 
results. With a p-value of 0.1, the sample-wide results for precipitation variation were 
indistinguishable from random and not statistically significant. Disregarding significance, 
however, the probability for same-year conflicts increased by 0.1% for every centimeter increase 
in precipitation from the expected normal. A 1 cm annual variation is fairly irrelevant, however. 
Cells in the sample experienced precipitation deviations ranging from -78 to 129 cm, and when 
the odds ratio is conflated to this scale conflict probability could increase by as much as 10%. 
This contradicts the negative relationship anticipated, rather finding that conflicts were more 
likely to occur in locations receiving more rainfall. Following the “abundance scenario” trends 
discovered in the qualitative analysis, a 1 year lag was applied to test the impact on next-year 
conflicts. The results of regression on the entire extent somewhat contradict this claim, showing 
that the predictive power of increased precipitation is actually higher for conflicts in the next 
year at an odds ratio of 1.004. This fails to support the claim that negative precipitation 
anomalies correlate with a greater likelihood of same-year and next year conflicts. Without 
considering marginalization, the results from Model 2 show conflict to be more likely in 
locations that are warmer than the year before and receiving more rainfall than normal.  
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Both the climate and marginalization variables were included in Model 3, in order to test 
the second hypothesis that these individual relationships would be strengthened when combined. 
The results provide some support for this claim, as the odds ratio for all three independent 
variables demonstrated marginal increases. The predictive power of marginalization increased by 
0.3%, temperature change by 0.1%, precipitation variation by 0.05%. Although these are 
certainly miniscule differences in the total risk percentage for conflict, the aggregate risk 
increase for each variable is important to inspect as well. For the precipitation variation variable, 
for example, the relative impact on conflict probability increased by approximately 50% when 
marginalization was considered as a covariate. The interaction between these sets of variables 
may have not been as strong as predicted, but it is clear that there exists some amplifying 
relationship, and at minimum the inclusion of ethnopolitical marginalization allows for greater 
precision in the comprehensive model. When Poisson GLM regression was performed that 
measure the effect on the count of conflicts rather than a binary coding (Table 2 in appendix), the 
predictive power of the climate variables increased by over 100%. This indicates that climate has 
a greater impact on the severity of conflict, rather than a simple determinant of where any 
conflict will occur.  
As has been proposed and discussed in previous sections of this study, the relationship 
between the explanatory and response variables is not likely to be constant across the entire 
study area and is influenced by localized social, political, and environmental factors. In order to 
dissect the existence of statistical differences in these settings, an additional iteration of Model 3 
was run grouping cells by country and then these country-level results were compared. Table 3 
summarizes these results, showing regression coefficients rather than odds ratios. Supporting the 
context theory, dramatically different relationships were observed between countries for all 
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independent variables. Temperature change was shown to have a significantly stronger positive 
effect on conflict probability in Central African Republic, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Sudan. 
These countries form a band across the northern portion of the extent, and could be classified as 
the Sahel States within the study (excluding Chad). A significant negative temperature 
interaction was observed in the Great Lakes countries of Congo and Kenya, and in Chad. The 
groupings of these country-level results indicate a relationship influenced heavily by geography.  
 
Table 3. GLM country level regression using M3  
 
Geographic differences were also observed in the country-level results for precipitation, 
although not following the exact binary grouping as temperature. Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South 
Sudan showed a negative impact on conflict probability, a departure from the positive 
relationship found across the entire sample extent, and implying that years with more 
precipitation reduce the likelihood of conflict there. Other countries demonstrated insignificant 
deviations from the sample coefficient, except for Central African Republic and Sudan where the 
Cameroon CAR Chad Congo Ethiopia Kenya Nigeria S. Sudan Sudan Uganda
Temp Change 0.132 0.982
*
-0.493
*
-0.223
*
0.499
* -0.287 0.165 0.279
*
0.415
* -0.072
(0.42) (0.23) (0.23) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.18)
EPR 0 0.643
*
0.377
* -0.064 -0.036 0.167 0.744
* 0.225 0.927
*
0.460
*
(.) (0.19) (0.17) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12)
Democracy 0 -0.205
* 0 -0.059
*
0.048
* 0.018 0.110
* 0 0.171
* -0.041
(.) (0.03) (.) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (.) (0.03) (0.04)
Precipitation 0.007 0.022
* 0.002 0.004
*
-0.008
* -0.004 -0.008
*
-0.012
*
0.017
* 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 0.709
*
0.366
*
0.659
*
0.679
*
0.243
*
0.576
*
0.901
*
0.632
*
0.626
* -0.023
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
N 2567 3417 5236 11390 5780 3213 5032 3417 7225 1156
BLM regression coefficients, standard errors given in parentheses
*
 p  < 0.05
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probability impact was increased by 2% and 1% respectively. Interpreted in the context of a 50 
cm increase in precipitation from normal, locations would be 100% more likely in CAR and 50% 
more likely in Sudan to experience a conflict in that year. When a 1 year lag was applied to these 
country-level results, the probability impact of positive precipitation variation increased 
significantly in Cameroon, CAR, Chad, and Sudan, and became more negative in Nigeria and the 
Congo DRC. These findings indicate that increased precipitation in the Sahel/Saharan states of 
Sudan, Chad and CAR is likely to produce more conflict in the same and next years, whereas it is 
likely to reduce the probability of conflict in states such as Nigeria, South Sudan and Ethiopia. A 
consistent pattern was discovered in the Great Lakes countries between their current year and lag 
year results that supports findings from qualitative analysis. In Kenya, Congo, and Uganda, the 
impact on conflict probability became more negative when the lag was applied. Again 
geographic patterns become clear in the country level results for precipitation, implying distinct 
groupings of results in Central Sahel, Great Lakes, and Periphery (Ethiopia and Nigeria) regions.  
Country-level results for social indicators demonstrated differences as well. 
Ethnopolitical marginalization was shown to have a much stronger effect in CAR, Nigeria, 
Sudan, and Uganda, but was above zero in all statistically significant findings. These results are 
supported by the literature and country specific case studies. Population had a slightly varying 
effect, most notably in Nigeria where it was shown to have a much greater influence on conflict 
probability, and in Uganda, Ethiopia and CAR where the impact was closer to zero. This verifies 
the urban concentration of unrest in coastal Nigeria, and the bush wars present in CAR and 
Uganda.  
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Discussion 
 The results of this study, both spatial and statistical, furcate from the general pessimistic 
tone in the academic literature on the existence of climate-induced conflict. Since the idea was 
first proposed in the late 1990’s and accepted as public knowledge in the late 2000’s, continued 
research with more sophisticated methodology has resulted in growing skepticism among the 
field’s top scholars. The inability of many studies, including the Theisen et al study that inspired 
this thesis, to identify a correlation between these variables using a range of variable 
operationalization and modeling methods has created doubt about the validity of this purported 
truism. In contrast to the growing lack of empirical support for this assertion, foreign policy and 
security authorities such as the US Department of Defense and the UN Security Council are 
incorporating instability due to climate change into their considerations for future conflicts. This 
inclusion is largely justified by qualitative case-study research on “climate wars” that are often 
compelling in their explanation of the localized phenomenon, but their existence has been shown 
to be difficult to replicate or model in large-n quantitative studies. Even in the results of this 
study, which has been limited to a subset of countries within a geographic area generally 
regarded to be prone to this interaction, it is quite evident that the impact of each variable varies 
widely depending on an immeasurable number of contextual factors. The methodology of the 
study, by combining the use of qualitative and quantitative spatial methods, attempts to bridge 
the gap between the apparent trends identified in case studies and the inconclusive results of 
more impersonal statistical models.  
 The synthesis of results from these methods provides some support for the claims that 
inspired the study, as well as the hypotheses based on those claims that were tested. Visual 
assessment of trends in the data layers over time provided a more concrete understanding of the 
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generalized spatial relationships between variables, and created a valuable tool for analyzing 
climate-conflict interactions for specific cases and environments. Because the large-n statistical 
analysis was probably more useful in determining general trends, the facilitation of this localized 
analysis provided perhaps the greatest utility in the study. The primary finding of this 
assessment, and an indicator of its usefulness, was that it became clear that changes in climate 
impact conflict likelihood differently across space. The ability to view changes in each variable 
over time illuminated distinct relationships that were geographically clustered and potentially 
based on differences in environmental characteristics. Interaction groups where phenomenon 
occurred similarly were roughly the Central Sahel, Great Lakes, and Periphery countries 
bordering a coast. The significance of the distinct trends identified in each region were then 
tested in the regression analysis, both across the entire sample extent and within each country. 
The combination of these two techniques provided a more comprehensive approach to study of a 
climate-conflict relationship, by bridging the gap between comparative case study analysis and 
disaggregated statistical regression. The specific findings of the study, and its limitations, are 
discussed further below.  
In the semi-arid Central Sahel countries such as South Sudan, Sudan, Central African 
Republic and Chad (in some cases), there appeared to be a positive relationship between 
precipitation increase and conflict onset, especially when a 1 year lag was applied to conflict. 
This interpretation would support the proposed abundance scenario theory where a surplus of a 
resource, in this case water, facilitates conflict. In already dry environments, short term 
precipitation deficiency could actually act as a barrier to the catalysis of conflicts when other risk 
factors are present. The negative correlation predicted in the theory of this thesis would likely be 
better explained by longer-term drought conditions that are not necessarily represented by the 
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variable operationalization used. Especially for civil war onset that involves organized combatant 
groups, an abundance of water would ease logistical challenges such as providing food and water 
for troops, and would generally provide better fighting conditions in these dry climates. This 
progression was evident with the Darfur conflict, where conflict materialized in a rainfall 
abundant year following a half decade of rainfall deficiency. The positive coefficients returned 
from country-level regression for the region largely supports this claim, with some minor 
inconsistencies. A common temperature correlation was also shared by these Central Sahel 
countries showing more conflict onset in years with warmer temperatures than the last. All of 
these countries, except for Chad, demonstrated significant positive coefficients that were mostly 
above the sample value. A spike in temperature in these already hot climates appears to be a 
stronger indicator for determining short-term conflict likelihood. These results make sense 
intuitively when hotter temperatures are viewed as an aggravating force on individuals. 
Additionally, areas inhabited by politically marginalized ethnic groups were very strongly 
correlated with conflict probability in these countries, similar to trends in the Periphery countries 
but contrary to trends in Great Lakes countries. The interaction of these factors in Central Sahel 
countries could be distilled by saying that years with hotter temperatures and above average 
precipitation are more likely to experience conflict, especially in areas inhabited by a 
marginalized group.  
The variable interaction was slightly different in the Periphery countries of Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, and some parts of Kenya. These countries comprise a diverse array of 
climate and environmental characteristics, but are related by their proximity to a coast and 
generally more temperate climate. These regions showed a similar positive temperature 
correlation to the rest of the sample, but the statistical significance of this relationship is 
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questionable in Nigeria and Cameroon. There were distinct cases of temperature spikes 
accompanying conflict outbreak in Ethiopia and Nigeria. Considerably warmer temperatures in 
2002 brought widespread unrest due to famine in Ethiopia, and heat across the entire sample 
extent in 2009 could have contributed to the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria and fighting with the 
Ogaden Liberation Front in Ethiopia. Most notably, these countries displayed a negative 
coefficient, or odds ratio less than 1, for precipitation variation. This indicates that in these 
environments more precipitation decreases, rather than increases, the likelihood of conflict. It 
can be inferred that negative precipitation variation contributes to conflict in these areas, which 
is supported by the literature on drought and pastoral conflict in Ethiopia and Nigeria.  
The Great Lakes countries of Congo, Uganda and western Kenya indicated a climate-
conflict relationship disparate from that found in the other regions. Here, increased temperature 
seemed to reduce the likelihood of conflict whereas positive precipitation variation slightly 
heightened it. This area receives much more precipitation than the other two, and is cooler than 
the states to north that border the Sahara. A strong relationship between drought and conflict was 
not anticipated in this region, but it managed to completely defy the proposed theory. If there 
indeed does exist a relationship between changes in climate and onset of unrest in this region, it 
is likely to follow the abundance scenario theory proposed in the results section. Mismanagement 
of abundant resources by the ruling group, or the lack thereof, or the ability for rising actor 
groups to get a stake in an abundant resource share are pathways to conflict (Alao 2007). Alao 
argues the importance of management, rather than presence, of a resource as a greater indicator 
for conflict risk, however, which would imply that marginalized groups possessing this barrier to 
state-level resource management would be more at risk. This dynamic was present in Uganda 
and to a lesser extent in Kenya, but was the opposite in the DRC. The inconsistency of variable 
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interactions in these countries therefore might suggest that a significant relationship between 
climate change and conflict does not exist, or is too complex to quantify so simply, in this 
equatorial region.  
The findings presented above and previously in the results section did possess their fair 
share of inconsistencies and shortcomings, however. It may seem that the discussion so far on a 
potential relationship is founded in an assumption that the relationship does exist, and/or 
exaggerating the causative strength of the climate variables. This tone is not intended to cloud 
the results of the study, but is rather a reflection of the quasi-qualitative nature of the study that 
attempts to show what the relationship can be in certain predictable scenarios. Clearly the 
relationships discovered in the regression analysis were not consistent across the entire sample, 
and were even inconsistent within the geographically clustered interaction groups and within 
countries themselves. Results from Chad, for example, demonstrated that temperature increases 
reduced the likelihood of conflict which differed from trends present in all of its neighboring 
countries. Many of these inconsistencies likely diluted the strength of correlation for climate 
variables, but this in itself is an important takeaway of the study. Because climate almost always 
plays only a minor role or no role at all in conflict propagation, there will be countless 
observations that do not support the hypotheses of this study. This has been identified as a 
limitation for almost all large-N studies on the topic, and it was a goal of this study to 
supplement findings from such methods with a visual narrative that conveys the situations where 
climate may or may not have influenced the situation. Discussion on the many examples of 
climate shifts that did not lead to conflict was largely omitted for this reason.  
There were further limitations to the study as well that may have impacted the findings, 
or could be improved by future iterations of the study. The primary limitations stem from the 
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availability and utilization of data for most of the variables. The methods of this study attempt to 
properly represent the real factors that influence conflict in this region in the most accurate way 
possible, but the ability to quantify and measure these factors is undeniably limited. Beyond the 
inherent complexity of factors contributing to conflict, the study was limited by the availability 
and accuracy of data. Since data could not be collected directly on the variables, the study relied 
on data that was already publicly available and was influenced by each source’s individual 
methods of collection. The ACLED dataset, for example, grew in the number of conflict events 
occurring every year not necessarily because there was more conflict occurring in the region, but 
likely due to improvements in event reporting and recording. Processing of climate data was also 
met with challenges since these datasets were only available with monthly totals/averages. 
Aggregating these values into yearly values may have diluted temperature extremes, or 
inaccurately represented seasonal precipitation deviations and inter-annual trends. The data had 
other temporal limitations as well. The beginning and end of the time series were determined 
solely by the beginning of the ACLED dataset in 1997, and the end of the climate datasets in 
2013. If more historical social conflict data and up to date temperature records were available, 
the study would have likely extended over a longer time-series and would have been better suited 
to model long-term changes.  
 Beyond addressing these limitations, this methodology could be improved upon and 
expanded in many ways. More contextual control variables should be included to determine the 
true interaction of factors. Only a few controls were included in the study due to limited data 
sources and the time required to prepare data for the independent and dependent variables. The 
inclusion of additional spatial variables into the model could refine and improve the results. 
These could include land cover type, primary economic activities, religious makeup, percentage 
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of GDP, and the presence and quality of infrastructure, among others. A regretful omission was a 
coding that would indicate whether a conflict was new or a continuation of a conflict from the 
previous year. This would allow for greater delineation of how climate influences conflict onset, 
continuation, and/or resolution. Accumulation of a more comprehensive dataset that includes a 
myriad of social, political, and environmental variables will be vital to improving the predictive 
power of any statistical model applied, but could also open the door to highly sophisticated 
analysis utilizing the emerging modeling power of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. 
Platforms such as Google’s TensorFlow have shown promise in modeling outcomes based on 
interactions of input variables in a variety of academic research and business applications, but as 
of yet have not been applied to climate-conflict research. Once the composition of variables that 
impact conflict in some way become more clear, all of these data points can be used to construct 
highly accurate and flexible models that can pinpoint an at-risk area weeks, months, or 
potentially years in advance. This could significantly improve the ability of governments and 
organizations to allocate resources to prevent and resolve conflict as this trend continues to 
worsen due to climate change. Although the methods of this study pale in comparison of 
sophistication, its attempt to improve the resolution of data and understand the more complex 
factors behind a spatial relationship between climate change and social conflict are vital steps on 
the path to more accurate models.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 This thesis finds some support for the hypotheses proposed, partially rejecting the first 
hypothesis and showing weak support for the second. Temperature was shown to increase the 
likelihood of conflict by approximately 11% for every centigrade increase from the previous 
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year. Precipitation variation was shown to have an insignificant positive impact across the entire 
sample area, but provided significant results for many countries when analysis was grouped by 
country. Marginalization was shown to have the greatest effect on conflict probability, increasing 
it by 37% across the entire sample and with much higher probability in certain countries. The 
strength of the relationship for temperature and marginalization increased when all three 
variables were modeled together, but not precipitation. These trends differed dramatically from 
country to country, however, and subsample trend groupings became clear when analysis was 
conducted at different scales. Conflicts in Sahel, Great Lakes, and Coastal/Periphery countries all 
interacted differently with the variables. Such impersonal regression analysis tells only half the 
story, however, and the data map layers were assessed visually over time to better understand the 
trends that manifested. From this, key circumstantial findings included precipitation abundance 
and temperature spikes in the outbreak years of both the Darfur conflict and Boko Haram 
uprising, and predictable high temperature– low precipitation conditions in especially violent 
years in Ethiopia. These two methods bolstered each other, the spatial analysis providing 
visualization and easier interpretation of statistical findings, and the regression analysis testing 
the validity of trends identified in the maps. Using this combo methodology was extremely 
useful, especially for researchers geographically or culturally removed from the intricacies 
present in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 The study was initially inspired as a test for claims that security concerns will worsen 
with climate change in this region. Upon completion of the study, it still remains unclear whether 
these claims carry weight in all circumstances. When assessing the claim that climate change 
will result in more conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, the first follow-up question should be “where 
in Sub-Saharan Africa?” Climate variation in the Sahel and Sudan influences conflict differently 
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than in the Rift Valley, which differs from the relationship present in the African Great Lakes 
and Congo Basin and etc. The answer to this question will almost always be a definitive “it 
depends”. Regardless of these differences, when disaggregated and analyzed the raster cells did 
demonstrate a significant relationship for both temperature and marginalization. These findings 
are applicable beyond the study and could have grave consequences under predicted climate 
change scenarios. Since the sample extent lies roughly on the equator, temperature is expected to 
increase by only 1.5° - 4° C by 2100 (Serdeczny et al 2015). It is difficult to extrapolate the 
impact of long-term increases from the methodology of the study, however one could infer that 
there will likely be more extreme temperature spikes in the future than were present in the time-
series. This could translate to a significant increase in conflicts over time, especially when a 
positive feedback loop with precipitation is considered. Although precipitation did not show 
significant results for the entire sample area, there were important interactions discovered for the 
countries bordering the Sahara desert. As desertification is predicted to accelerate due to climate 
change, this relationship could strengthen and pose serious threat to populations living there. 
Threatened living conditions and resultant conflicts are likely to induce migration as well, which 
this study has shown to also be accompanied by unrest.  
 It is clear that further and more detailed study is required in this topic that better 
understands complex interplay between conflict risk factors. The spatial methods used in this 
study should be expanded, incorporating more country level variables and including more 
geographically organized data for each cell. Additionally, a more dynamic approach to analysis 
that can decipher results beyond yearly constraints, viewing monthly, daily, or decadal 
relationships would expand the potential for analysis. Those modifications, and the ones 
mentioned in the discussion section, could greatly improve the results of this study and benefit its 
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application to other topics. The combined qualitative-quantitative disaggregated spatial approach 
could be applied to social topics ranging from climate and migration interactions, to voting 
patterns, or even beyond the scope of political science research. For now, the findings of this 
study and others should continue to influence policy decision-making that address mitigating the 
symptoms, conflict and insecurity, as well as more importantly the root cause: climate change 
accelerated by human activity. The potential for mass instability, loss of life, and continuation of 
misguided political and economic systems in Sub-Saharan Africa should be more than enough to 
motivate international cooperation in curbing emissions and encouraging sustainable lifestyle 
changes. Unfortunately, findings from this study and others like it may never be convincing 
enough or the problem close enough to home to be a compelling motivator for the primary 
contributors to climate change.  
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Appendix 
 
Precipitation Variation and Conflict 1998-2013 
The distribution of precipitation anomalies from the long term mean and conflicts are presented 
in the maps below. For precipitation, yellow-green values approximately indicate the normal. 
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Temperature Change and Conflict 1998-2013 
Temperature change from the previous year and conflict distribution are shown for each year. 
Darker yellow and orange hues indicate temperature change above zero, and red cells show 
temperature change over 1° and/or more than 20 conflicts.  
 
55 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
Political Marginalization and Conflict  
Selected years where there were changes in the territory of marginalized groups in shown along 
with conflict distribution. “Marginalized” is defined as areas inhabited by ethnic groups 
classified as irrelevant, powerless, or discriminated, and is shown in pink.  
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Poisson GLM Regression for Conflict Counts 
 Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Temp Change 0.177 0.019 9.120 0.000 0.139 0.215 
Precipitation 0.005 0.000 13.440 0.000 0.004 0.005 
EPR 0.739 0.013 56.300 0.000 0.714 0.765 
Democracy 0.027 0.002 16.090 0.000 0.023 0.030 
Population 0.623 0.004 141.690 0.000 0.614 0.632 
_cons -7.959 0.054 -147.750 0.000 -8.065 -7.854 
 
GLM Logistic Regression with 1 year lag 
 
 
GLM Random Effects Logistic Regression 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf.Interval]
Temp Change -0.054 0.045 -1.200 0.231 -0.143 0.034
EPR 0.307 0.031 9.810 0.000 0.246 0.368
Democracy 0.046 0.004 11.470 0.000 0.038 0.054
Precipitation 0.003 0.001 3.830 0.000 0.002 0.005
lnPopulation 0.493 0.011 45.160 0.000 0.471 0.514
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Temp Change 0.1822 0.0192 9.48 0 0.145 0.220
EPR 0.0250 0.0275 0.91 0.363 -0.029 0.079
Democracy 0.0226 0.0028 7.96 0 0.017 0.028
lnPopulation 0.4414 0.0194 22.76 0 0.403 0.479
Precipitation 0.0042 0.0004 11.04 0 0.003 0.005
/lnalpha 1.6219 0.0324 1.558 1.685
alpha 5.0628 0.1642 4.751 5.395
